

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HOMELAND, WHAT DOES RIGHT LOOK LIKE?

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, many people in the government and the Department of Defense have debated the domestic role of the military. With the increased possibility of a terrorist attack using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in the homeland, many in the Department of Defense and the federal government believe that the military should play a greater role in homeland security. They argue that the military should be prepared to fight the nation's wars and should also provide a force to assist in the consequence management from a successful WMD attack. There are many issues to this debate that must be examined ranging from funding, training, equipping, size of the force, and the ability to move to the incident site quickly and with the capabilities to save the lives of those affected by the attack. This paper will focus on determining the correct size and defining the capabilities that this force should have to allow it to move quickly enough to the incident site to conduct our primary mission, saving lives. If we fail to plan and execute this mission properly, we would fail the American people and it would have grave implications for the homeland.

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HOMELAND, WHAT DOES RIGHT LOOK LIKE?

Chemical, Biological, radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield explosive (CBRNE) incidents will pose a great challenge to the security of the American people for the foreseeable future. A terrorist attack on U.S. soil, an accidental CBRNE incident, or one caused by a natural disaster could create catastrophic conditions likely to overwhelm response capabilities of civil authorities and we the military must be prepared to respond.

—General Victor E. Renuart,
Commander, USNORTHERN COMMAND

The Attack

On September 11, 2001, a group of Islamic terrorists executed a series of coordinated suicide attacks against the homeland of the United States. This was the first foreign-borne,¹ major attack² against the homeland since the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The tragic events of 9-11 proved that the United States Government was not prepared to combat this type of direct, transnational threat. The federal government would have to transform or create new organizations to meet the challenges and secure America from another such horrific attack.

Prior to this attack, no specific agency or department within the federal government was charged with the security of the homeland. The primary agency for collection of foreign intelligence was the CIA and the primary agency for conducting domestic investigations was the FBI. The 9-11 Commission report found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) “did not have the capability to link the collection knowledge gained by the agents in the field to national priorities.” Domestic agencies deferred this requirement to the FBI believing it to be their responsibility.³ The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also shared in the blame from the 9-11 report. The report suggested that the CIA needed to greatly “improve its ability to collect intelligence from

human agents.”⁴ Although the FBI and CIA both needed similar information, they found it extremely difficult to share information. “The US government did not have a way of pooling intelligence and using it to guide the planning and assignment of responsibilities for joint operations involving entities like the CIA, the FBI, the Department of State, the military and other agencies involved in homeland security.”⁵

DOD was also found to have problems with intelligence sharing.⁶ The 9-11 Report found that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had “limited authority over the direction of the intelligence community, including agencies within the Department of Defense.”⁷ DOD had other problems identified in the 9-11 report also. The report stated that “at no point before 9-11 was the Department of Defense fully engaged in the mission of countering al Qaeda, even though this was perhaps the most dangerous foreign enemy threatening the United States.”⁸ DOD was commended in the report for establishing NORTHCOM as the command charged with defending the homeland but NORAD was cited for their inability to protect the nation’s air space and were cited as “unprepared for the attacks launched against them.”⁹

The events of 9-11 forced the Federal Government and DOD to act quickly and implement major organizational changes. The Federal Government created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOD created United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Now that the whole of government had reacted to form these new organizations, they would have to determine how they would execute their assigned missions. DHS was charged with the overall mission of securing the homeland but NORTHCOM was charged with the mission of defending the homeland.¹⁰ Not only would NORTHCOM be required to determine how to best defend the homeland

but they were also tasked to execute support to civil authorities in the event of a disaster, naturally occurring or man-made within the continental United States, Alaska and territorial waters.¹¹ Inherent in the mission was providing forces that had the ability to react with sufficient speed and capability to meet the requirements of civil leaders. If this event were another terrorist attack like the attack on September 11th, the attack could range from the bombing of a building to catastrophic, nuclear attack against a major city within the United States.

The Threat

As far back as 1998, the National Security Strategy stated, “Due to our military superiority, potential enemies, whether nations or terrorist groups, may be more likely in the future to resort to terrorist acts or other attacks against vulnerable civilian targets in the United States instead of conventional military operations.”¹² These attacks could be in the form of conventional terrorist attacks like the Oklahoma City bombing or in the form of a WMD attack like the attack in the Japanese subway. Numerous documents over the last 20 years have stated that the greatest threat to our national security is the employment of WMD on the United States soil by a non-state actor.

Biological and chemical weapons are recognized by many experts as the most dangerous and easiest to develop. There is a great deal of “how to” information available on the internet to teach any would-be terrorist how to attack desired targets and terrorist events over the last few years show this to be the case. Internet sites give step-by-step instruction and show would-be terrorists how to produce the agents. It even suggests mechanisms for delivery of the weapon for the greatest possible effect.¹³

Nuclear weapons, although much more dangerous, are harder to develop and employ. With the proliferation of nuclear material around the world in recent years, the

demise of the Soviet Union and inadequate nuclear control in countries like Pakistan, the possibility of some of the nuclear material finding its way into the hands of a terrorist group is increasing every day.¹⁴ The catastrophic results of this type of attack make it one of the major concerns of the federal government.

Two even more likely attack scenarios are the terrorist's use of a toxic industrial agent such as chlorine, as seen in Iraq, or a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) deployed in a major city.¹⁵ Both of these scenarios are real, dangerous and relatively easy for a terrorist to execute. The fear and absolute terror that would grip the nation after a WMD attack in the form of any of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) agents could devastate the nation. As far back as 1997, Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, stated that, "A lone madman or fanatics with a bottle of chemicals, a batch of plague inducing bacteria or a crude nuclear bomb can threaten or kill tens of thousands of people in a single act of malevolence. These are not far off or far-fetched scenarios. They are real; they are here; and they are now."¹⁶ The problem was that no organization within the government was determining how to combat these scenarios. The federal government created DHS and assigned them the mission of securing the homeland.

Department of Homeland Security

Historically, the homeland defense mission belonged to the Army and Air National Guard. Due to the events of 9-11, the federal government created DHS on November 25, 2002. DHS was specifically created to secure America "against those who seek to disrupt the American way of life."¹⁷ The DHS charter also included "preparation for and response to all hazards and disasters."¹⁸ Due to the second part of

the DHS mission statement, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was placed under their control.

DOD had worked with the FEMA for years in assisting civil authorities with responding to many types of disasters. This type of support is one of the missions for DOD under the much broader mission set currently known as Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).¹⁹ Historically, DOD would provide support to civil authorities when the local authorities were overwhelmed by a disaster and had exhausted all of the local and state assets. The disaster could be man-made or natural, such as wild fires, hurricanes, floods or other catastrophic events as seen with Hurricane Katrina or the California Wild Fires.

Prior to 9-11, the possibility of a WMD threat to the homeland was a “wild card scenario”²⁰ that had been discussed extensively but with minimal action taken to plan for such an event. The plan in place for the United States was the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and it was designed to deal with major natural disasters or emergencies that would overwhelm the local and state responders.²¹ After 9-11, the National Response Plan (NRP) was established for the federal government to assist in responding to catastrophic events or emergencies such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks.²² The NRP was published in December 2004 but was superseded by the National Response Framework (NRF) on March 22, 2008.²³ DHS oversaw the creation of these documents which were used extensively by NORTHCOM as they determined what DOD would need to perform its mission and how they would respond to support civil authorities if required.

Planning (The 15 National Planning Scenarios)

As the interagency continued the WMD planning process, the federal government attempted to define the requirements for the federal response. The Homeland Security Council (HSC) developed and published a set of National Planning Scenarios in April 2005.²⁴ The purpose of these scenarios was to represent the greatest dangers facing the United States in order to identify the spectrum of tasks and capabilities needed to prepare for and respond to many different hazards.²⁵ The 15 National Planning Scenarios provide parameters regarding the nature, scale and complexity of significant incidents for the nation.²⁶ They include events ranging from a terrorist WMD attack to natural disasters and represent a range of potential incidents, rather than every possible threat or hazard. The scenarios provide the basis to define prevention, protection, response and recovery tasks that must be performed, as well as the capabilities required to perform them.²⁷

As the interagency lead planners began planning against these scenarios, they determined that they could not plan for all scenarios simultaneously. They decided to prioritize the fifteen scenarios and begin planning for the worst scenario first, scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation, 10 kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device (IND).²⁸ FEMA was designated as the lead for the DHS planning effort. This resulted in the interagency planning team focusing primarily on the response and recovery aspects of the mission. This was due to FEMA's longstanding mission of emergency response and recovery in the event of natural disasters.²⁹

As the planning proceeded, the number of projected casualties in the 10KT nuclear event immediately overwhelmed the capabilities of the state and local officials and it became obvious that the federal government would have to assist. It quickly

became apparent to DOD that they would have to develop capabilities to serve as part of the federal response. Not only would the actual WMD event create unimaginable problems for the country, the clean-up of most of these events would be a huge undertaking for the federal government. This is why the federal government expended an extraordinary amount of effort and funding aimed at preventing or mitigating such an event. The federal government was worst casing the possible attack scenarios and planning for extensive restoration efforts if we should fail to prevent the attack.

United States Army Northern Command

While the federal government was evolving with the creation of DHS, DOD was not far behind. DOD acted quickly to increase its emphasis on defending the homeland by creating NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM was activated at Peterson Air Force Base on October 1, 2002. NORTHCOM assumed the mission of homeland defense, but it was also tasked to conduct civil support operations in the homeland. NORTHCOM was “specifically to conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the command's assigned area of responsibility; and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations.”³⁰

In our nation’s history, it was the National Guard that had always served as the organization charged with providing a force to secure and defend the homeland but now NORTHCOM was the Combatant Command charged with defending North America. NORTHCOM was also given the mission of consequence management as was the requirement to provide assistance and support to civil authorities in managing the consequences from natural and manmade disasters such as forest fires, hurricanes and the 9-11 attack.³¹ Due to the increased threat of another terrorist attack in the homeland

using convention explosives or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the President and Congress pushed DOD to ensure the homeland was properly defended. Many of these same senior leaders believed that the military should also provide a force to assist civil authorities with the clean-up or consequence management of the aftermath of a catastrophic, WMD attack. These leaders believed that DOD had more than enough forces not committed to current operations that they should be able to provide a substantial rapid reaction force to respond to any location in the United States and assist with the aftermath of such an attack. Based on this requirement, the Secretary of Defense directed DOD to establish a CBRNE Consequence Management force.³²

The DOD Response

Prior to the attack of 9-11, the Federal Government along with DOD recognized the CBRN threat and moved to establish Weapons of Mass destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs). President Clinton in the commencement address at the U.S. Naval Academy in May 1998 announced that “the nation would do more to protect its citizens against the growing threat of chemical and biological terrorism.”³³ As part of this effort, he said, the Department of Defense would form ten teams to support state and local authorities in the event of an incident involving weapons of mass destruction. The WMD Civil Support Teams, formed from National Guard forces, were established to rapidly deploy to an incident site and assist in determining the nature and extent of an attack or incident. They were to provide expert technical advice on WMD response operations and help identify and support the arrival of follow-on state and federal military response forces.³⁴ The ten initial teams were established and fielded in the ten FEMA regions as a part of the Federal approach to reacting to a catastrophic event.

Due to the success of the WMD-CSTs, DOD asked for and congress approved an additional 47 CSTs bringing the total to 57 teams.³⁵ After further analysis, DOD and the federal government decided that they needed more than just the assessment of the CSTs at the incident site. They needed additional assistance for local authorities with greater command and control, an increased search and extraction capability, greater CBRN detection and decontamination, and a capability for medical treatment. DOD in conjunction with the National Guard then established the CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERF-P) and fielded 17 CERF-Ps aligned with the ten FEMA regions.³⁶ DOD believed that between these two capabilities, it had provided a significant force to assist the state and local authorities but struggled with the possible need for a larger, more robust federal force to support the federal response if the state and local officials were overwhelmed.

NORTHCOM Planning

NORTHCOM began a parallel planning effort while at the same time participating in the DHS interagency planning efforts for their AOR. In constructing AOR specific plans, NORTHCOM identified several issues to solve or overcome to successfully execute their consequence management plan. Several of these problems were: defining the threat and mission for DOD, determine the unit size and composition (active duty, reserve, National Guard or a mixture of all three components), capabilities of the force, the concept of employment, the DOD mission priority, Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) associated problems³⁷, and finally equipment, training and money for the mission. Several of these problems, the mission priority, troop mixture, equipment, training and money, fall outside the scope of this paper and will not be addressed.

NORTHCOM's first priority was to determine the mission. Once NORTHCOM knew the mission, they would then move onto the unit capabilities which would then drive the size of the force needed. The final piece for the planners would be to determine the concept for the employment. As NORTHCOM began planning the new mission, their planners first needed guidance on the number of events to plan against. This guidance was given by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense on March 11, 2003. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD/HD), Secretary Paul McHale signed a classified memorandum for the Director of the Joint Staff. In the now declassified memorandum, Secretary McHale gave guidance for NORTHCOM to create three CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRFs) to react to three to six nearly simultaneous, catastrophic events.³⁸

After receiving Secretary McHale's guidance, NORTHCOM began mission analysis and determined that there were two parts to this newly assigned mission. There was a "prevent/search" portion of the mission and also the "response or consequence management" portion. The prevent task is an absolutely essential piece of the NORTHCOM mission but falls outside the scope of this paper which will concentrate only on the consequence management portion of the DOD mission.

The CCMRF

During mission analysis, NORTHCOM determined that there would be a requirement several thousand Soldiers per CCMRF and would require a minimum of one CCMRF per event. The planners also determined the capabilities that needed to be resident in the force would be extensive. They would need a CBRN assessment and decontamination capability and a very extensive medical treatment capability. The force

would need a large command and control (C2) section with an extensive communications capability to control the forces in the event area. The CCMRF would also need to have a large sustainment capability and it would also need to provide force protection around the incident site. With the type of catastrophic event that NORTHCOM was planning against, the reaction force would also require an extensive transportation capability, both ground and air.

The CCMRF forces would provide first responder type support (medical, search and rescue) at such an event in an attempt to save the lives of the victims as depicted in Figure 2. It would arrive shortly after the CST and CERF-P forces and augment these forces and also provide a much greater command and control capability at the incident site. The CCMRF forces would be divided into three Task Forces: Task Force Operations, Task Force Medical, and Task Force Aviation. The CCMRF would also have a Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters as depicted below in Figure 1.³⁹




Figure 1.

NORTHCOM envisioned a force with the capability to quickly alert and deploy to an incident site with a large first responder capability to save the lives of the thousands of personnel in the affected area. Their solution, the CCMRF, would deploy to the incident site very quickly and with an increased C2 capability, assist in controlling the operations around the incident site. The assumption was that the local officials would have been overwhelmed by the catastrophic nature of the event and would have requested assistance from the federal government or the President would have directed the federal response to activate. The event, as depicted in Figure 2,⁴⁰ would be of such a catastrophic level or magnitude that it would require multiple WMD-CSTs from surrounding states and CERF-Ps from numerous surrounding regions.




Figure 2.

It also depicts the CCMRF arriving within the first 48-96 hours to provide additional support. The expectation is that the CCMRF would be a force that could be required to remain on site for 30 days or longer to assist with the operational control of

the site. The problem with the concept as depicted in this chart is that the CCMRF deploys from many locations across the US. Certain forces may have the ability to arrive within the first four days to assist in assessing the situation, but the majority of forces will only begin movement by day 4. The CCMRF does not have the ability to arrive quickly enough, with the correct force capability to save the lives of the affected population. The only teams from the CCMRF that would arrive at the site within 24-48 hours would be the initial C2 section and some of the assessment assets but the life saving assets would not arrive until much later. NORTHCOM confirmed this fact during the conduct of exercise ARDENT SENTRY-NORTHERN EDGE 07. During this exercise, NORTHCOM moved approximately 2,000 personnel to Camp Atterbury, IN. This movement of less than 50% of an actual CCMRF size force with weeks of pre-planning took over one week to accomplish.⁴¹ Observations like these caused DOD leaders to re-analyze the CCMRF organization and look for other possible solutions.

Filling the Gap: Capability and Speed

Attempting to solve the complex problem of consequence management in the homeland, the Department of Defense has made excellent strides and is moving in the correct direction. The decision to establish NORTHCOM as a Geographic Combatant Command was appropriate and solved the question of which combatant commander was charged with the defense of the homeland. Defense of the homeland was and remains DOD's number one priority. DOD's decision to establish the CSTs and CERF-Ps may not have solved the problem of preventing a WMD attack but it was a great initial step forward in assessing and starting the recovery from a WMD attack.

The next major step was to establish a larger force that would provide the next level of assistance, the federal response, to assist the local, state, and regional forces in

the event of a catastrophic attack. NORTHCOM's solution was 4,500 man Brigade Combat Team (BCT) size force, the CCMRF. The CCMRF was a great force with tremendous capabilities but the problem with CCMRF was that along with its great capability comes great size and large numbers of personnel to man the force. The size of the organization makes it cumbersome and very slow to move and react. To fill the capabilities required in the CCMRF, the force providers were also required to look across the entire homeland.

The organizational structure set for the first CCMRF came from all the services and across numerous states. The units that comprise the CCMRFs are so geographically dispersed that it would take several days to move the assessment and life saving forces to the site. As stated earlier, based on the size of a single CCMRF, it would take several more days to move the remainder of the force to the incident site. NORTHCOM had established a force that was extremely capable but could not move to the incident site quickly enough to execute the mission of saving the lives of the victims. They would also arrive too slowly to assist with the medical treatment of the victims or be able to assist with the search and rescue mission. All the speed in the world with no capability does nothing for the people in need at the site but conversely, having a great capability that cannot get to the site quickly enough to make a difference means nothing to the casualties either.

Using the technical and operational capabilities of the CCMRF as a base, one must now look at a new organization to serve as an intermediate or bridge organization between the state CSTs and CERF-Ps and the federal CCMRF. The proposed force would need to be regionally positioned, similar to the CERF-Ps, in the 10 FEMA regions

to give it a much greater ability to react to a catastrophic incident quickly. The new organization, the Regional Response Force (RRF), would probably need to be about a battalion size organization, approximately 500 personnel. The RRF would have many of the capabilities organic to the CCMRF such as command and control, CBRN assessment, search and extraction, decontamination, emergency medical, and force protection but it would be a much smaller force than the CCMRF. The RRF would serve as the federal level CBRN response force within each FEMA region and provide life-saving capabilities within the first 12-24 hours. With their command and control capabilities, the RRF would also be capable of establishing the initial operational control structure for all DOD forces on the ground at the incident site.

Although the RRF is an excellent bridge capability and possible solution to the problem, the CCMRFs or a portion of it must still be factored into the final solution. To determine the best solution, one must consider several criteria. The criteria that should be used to evaluate the possible solutions sets would be total number of personnel, speed to the incident site, technical capabilities for a single incident, operational capabilities for a single site and lastly, capabilities to operate at three separate incident sites simultaneously with the required technical and operational capabilities.

Standing the Test of Evaluation

The first criterion used to evaluate possible solutions would be the total number of personnel within the CCMRF organization. The total number of personnel in each current CCMRF construct is approximately 4500-5000⁴². Since the stated requirement is to be able to react to three nearly, simultaneous catastrophic event, this would make the total number of personnel for utilization in a possible solution for all three CCMRFs at a maximum of approximately 15,000 personnel. So the total number of personnel

required for all three CCMRFs cannot exceed 15,000 and this would therefore be the screening criteria for all considered COAs.

The second criteria to evaluate COAs would be the ability of the force to arrive rapidly enough to save the lives of the victims at the incident site. Normally, the expectation is that life saving organizations arrive at an attack site as quickly as possible. The CSTs are set to deploy within the first three hours⁴³ to provide an initial assessment of the suspected or actual WMD attack. The CST advanced party is required to deploy within 1.5 hours of notification. The CERF-P is required to deploy within six hours⁴⁴ of notification to provide more robust support to the CST and first responders. The next DOD capability must be capable of deploying within the first 12-24 hours after an attack. In addition to arriving at the scene quickly, the CCMRF must bring the right capabilities: life saving, medical treatment, command and control, etc., to save lives and assist in the actual conduct of operations at the incident site.

The third and a fourth criterion used to evaluate the proposed force would be the overall “capabilities” of the force. The capability criteria would be divided into two subsets: technical capabilities and operational capabilities. The third criteria, technical capabilities, would be those capabilities associated with the initial assessment of an incident site and saving the lives of the victims at the site through search and extraction and medical treatment. This would also include assessment capabilities as these capabilities relate to characterizing the site for contamination from chemical agents, biological agents, toxic industrial chemicals (TICs), toxic industrial materials (TIMs) or radiological contamination associated with a radiological dispersion device (RDD) or

improvised nuclear device (IND). Decontamination capabilities would also be included in this requirement due to the need to decontaminate victims of a WMD attack.⁴⁵

Operational capabilities, the fourth criteria, would be the capabilities associated with command and control, sustainment, transportation and force protection due to the requirement for the force to provide support and assistance for 30 days or more. Therefore, the force must have a sufficient sustainment capability to accomplish this mission. The transportation capability would need to have both air and ground capabilities due to the need for both emergency and normal resupply missions around the incident area and possible medical evacuation of casualties by air and ground. In and around a catastrophic incident site, civil unrest and violence will be prevalent so force protection would be another vitally important operational capability.⁴⁶

Any proposed COAs to this complex problem would have an additional requirement that they must be evaluated against. This criteria resulted from the requirement from the 11 March 2003 memorandum from the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD).⁴⁷ DOD must be able to conduct operations at three separate sites simultaneously. As stated earlier, neither arriving at the site quickly but without the right technical capabilities to save lives, nor arriving at the site with a great capability but too slowly to save any lives are viable alternatives. Whatever the final solution, DOD must be able to accomplish this unique mission and meet these five technical and operational requirements.

In analyzing the problem, one must focus on the requirement of providing a more robust capability in support of state and local first responders (including the CSTs and CERF-Ps) to save lives and reduce suffering in the immediate aftermath of three nearly

simultaneously, catastrophic WMD attacks. The solution determined by NORTHCOM was a huge 4,500 man organization loaded with all the technical and operational capabilities required for mission accomplishment. NORTHCOM would be required to establish three of these response forces across the homeland. The NORTHCOM response moved from a CST or a 30 man, platoon size organization to the CERF-P or a 150 man, company size organization straight to the CCMRF which was equivalent to a BCT. The NORTHCOM response did not provide for an intermediate size organization or a RRF arriving prior to the BCT. Based on the requirement, NORTHCOM created three large organizations to respond to these three catastrophic incidents. The proposed organization, the RRF, would be similar to the CERF-Ps but a great deal more robust in all required capabilities.

What Does Right Look Like

When identifying viable courses of action (COAs), one must consider multiple combinations of the CCMRF and RRF organizations to determine the best possible solution. This paper will examine six COAs:

1. The current 3 CCMRF construct with no change
2. 0 CCMRFs and one RRF in each of the 10 FEMA regions
3. 3 CCMRFs and one RRF in each of the 10 FEMA regions
4. 3 CCMRFs(-) and one RRF in each of the 10 FEMA regions
5. 2 CCMRFs(-) and one RRF in each of the 10 FEMA regions
6. 1 CCMRFs(-) and one RRF in each of the 10 FEMA regions

COA 1 would use the current NORTHCOM approved construct of the CCMRF and utilize three CCMRFs to provide the required response. As discussed earlier, the three CCMRFs would be organized with all the technical and operational capabilities

required to support the response to three nearly simultaneous, catastrophic CBRNE events. This COA would have no associated RRFs. COA 2 would completely delete the requirement for the CCMRFs in favor of a complete regional response with the RRFs. The RRFs would have some of the operational and a majority of the technical capabilities removed from the CCMRF. The RRFs would be capable of executing the missions associated with the initial command and control at the site and would also be very capable of saving lives and reducing the suffering of the victims. The proposed RRF structure will remain the same for COAs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 since each of these COAs have ten RRFs in their composition. The three complete CCMRFs and ten RRFs COA would be the solution discussed in COA 3. This COA would combine the best of both force capabilities. The COA 3 CCMRFs would be fully manned and equal to the CCMRFs in COA 1. The RRFs would also be fully manned and organized as in COA 2 to execute their mission.

Once again, to create the CCMRF (-) organization, a portion of the operational and a majority of the technical capabilities would be removed from the CCMRFs thus creating a CCMRF (-). The modified CCMRFs (-) would maintain the enhanced command and control capability, a greater sustainment capability than the RRF and a much greater ability to conduct transportation operations in support of operations around the incident site. The CCMRF (-) would also have much greater force protection capabilities than the RRFs but the RRFs would bring the rapid reaction or speed capability to the force and also the life saving capabilities. The redistribution of forces would reduce the number of personnel contained within each modified CCMRF (-) to approximately 3,000.

COAs 4-6 utilize the smaller or modified CCMRF. Where COAs 1 and 3 were organized with fully manned CCMRFs. COAs 4-6 all retain fully capable RRFs in each of the 10 FEMA regions. COA 4 would retain three CCMRF (-) formations in combination with the RRFs. COA 5 would be very similar to COA 4 with one distinct difference. COA 5 would only have two modified CCMRFs (-) contained within the construct. It would have the full complement of ten RRFs as in COAs 2 – 4 but the CCMRFs (-) would only be able to react to two separate incident sites. In the final COA or COA 6, the solution would have only one modified CCMRF (-) and thus only able to react to a single, catastrophic incident site. It would again have ten fully equipped RRFs to react throughout the homeland.

The Final Analysis

When evaluating these six COAs, one must again refer back to the requirement as stated by the Office of Secretary of Defense,⁴⁸ “the ability to conduct operations at three separate sites simultaneously.” The second requirement is the self imposed cap of 15,000 personnel committed to this mission for the homeland. The total force is not allowed to exceed this maximum.

When evaluating COA1 against response requirements for three sites, it is evident that the three CCMRFs would be able to accomplish the consequence management mission except for saving victims lives. This COA also provides great technical and operational capabilities at one, two or three separate incident sites. The only problem with COA 1 is that, as explained throughout this a paper, it does not arrive at the incident site quickly enough to actually assist in saving the lives of the victims that were attacked.⁴⁹ Based on the NORTHCOM construct of approximately 4,500⁵⁰ personnel per CCMRF, COA 1 also meets our screening criteria of having no more than

15,000 personnel for the overall organization. COA 1 is a viable alternative but would not be the preferred solution.

COA 2's organization also maintains the ability to initially command and control or operate three incident sites with multiple RRFs although at a much reduced level when comparing the RRFs (battalion size organization) with three CCMRFs (brigade size organization). This COA also meets the personnel screening requirement of 15,000 or less personnel. The ten RRF COA provides excellent technical capabilities at all three incident sites and it arrives very quickly due to its regional orientation. The RRF option lacks many of the other operational capabilities like air and ground transportation and force protection that the CCMRFs would provide. COA 2's major shortage is the RRFs inability to operate the site for a prolonged or sustained period of time. COA 2 meets all requirements and has the ability to conduct operational control around one, two or three sites for a short period of time. This COA lacks the ability and is not designed to operationally control one site much less three separate sites for a prolonged duration of 30 days or longer.

When considering COA 3, it contains three CCMRFs so it definitely retains the capability to simultaneously operate three geographically separate incident sites. In analyzing this COA against our second criteria or the screening criteria of 15,000 personnel, it is obvious that it would not meet this limiting factor. The three CCMRFs have approximately 15,000 personnel and when the 5,000 personnel from the ten RRFs are added into the total personnel numbers, this COA would require approximately 20,000 personnel. COA 3 provides ten RRFs in addition to the CCMRFs so it would provide excellent technical and operational capabilities to all three incident sites.

Finally, in terms of speed, with the ten RRFs, this COA would arrive at the scene very quickly. This COA would provide the best capability of all but due to the fact that it requires more personnel than allowed, it is excluded from further consideration.

COAs 4, 5, and 6 are all similar. They each have ten RRFs assigned but have different numbers of CCMRFs (-). COA 4 would have ten RRFs and three CCMRFs (-). Since this COA has three modified CCMRF (-) organizations contained its structure, it definitely has the ability to conduct operations at three separate sites. Once again, a majority of the assessment, life saving, search and rescue, decontamination and medical capabilities would be removed from the CCMRF and put into the RRFs. Also, a portion of the command and control would be transferred to the RRFs for initial C2 until the CCMRF (-) arrives at the site to assume control. This would reduce the numbers contained within each modified CCMRF (-) to approximately 3,000 personnel and bring the numbers of personnel for this COA under the 15,000 screening limit. With the speed to the site of the RRFs, COA 4 would be equal to any of the COAs with the ten RRFs included. In terms of operational and technical capabilities, COA 4 should be one of the very best. The only COA that should be better would be the COA 3 with three complete CCMRFs and ten RRFs. With the ability to maintain the enhanced command and control capability, greater sustainment, transportation and force protection abilities of the CCMRF, COA 4 has equal capability as the COA 1 with three full CCMRFs and better than COA 5 with two CCMRFs (-) or COA 6 with one CCMRF (-). It appears that COA 4 is the preferred solution.

The final two COAs, COAs 5 and 6, are very similar to COA 4 with the exception of fewer CCMRF like organizations. COA 5 would have two CCMRF (-) organizations

where COA 6 would have only one CCMRF (-) in its organizational structure. As is evident in Table 1, these COAs would not perform as well as COA 4 if there is a requirement for operating three separate sites. Some may ask, why even discuss these final two COAs. The reason is that if the original requirement from the Office of the Secretary of Defense were modified to one or two nearly simultaneously events, these solutions would be preferred due to an overall reduction in resources required. With the requirement as currently stated, COA 4 is the recommended solution.

A graphic depiction of the COA comparison is seen in Table 1. The requirements to arrive quickly enough to save lives and reduce suffering (Speed) and the ability to operate three separate sites (3 Sites) at the same time are of greater importance than the other three criteria. They will therefore be given an extra weight of (2). The number of personnel (15,000) will be the screening criteria for the decision matrix. If a COA exceeds the maximum number of 15,000, it will be excluded. The remaining criteria, technical and operational capabilities, will carry equal weighting in the decision matrix. Within the matrix, each COA will be rank ordered from one to six with one being the best and six being the worst rating. Based on the results listed in Table 1, COA 4 is determined to be the best solution. If not for the number of personnel screening criteria, COA 3 would be the best but because it exceeded the maximum 15,000 personnel allowed, this COA is excluded.

	COA 1 (3+0)	COA 2 (0+10) Worst	COA 3 (3+10) Excluded	COA 4 [3(-)+10] Best	COA 5 [2(-)+10]	COA 6 [1(-)+10]
3 SITES (2)	(2) 4	(6) 12	(2) 4	(2) 4	(4) 8	(5) 10
PERSONNEL	3	3	6X	3	3	3
TECH CAP	3	3	1	3	5	6
OPER CAP	2.5	6	1	2.5	4	5
SPEED (2)	(6) 12	(3) 6	(3) 6	(3) 6	(3) 6	(3) 6
TOTAL	24.5	30	18X	18.5	26	30

Table 1.

With the selection of COA 4 which includes the recommendation for a regional response (RRF) supported by the larger CCMRF (-) for sustained operations, it follows that the forces positioned to best fulfill the RRF requirement or take on this mission would probably be the National Guard. This is due to the fact that National Guard forces are currently located in every state and FEMA region and are currently manning the CST and CERF-P units. In the recently released QDR, the Secretary of Defense recognized this fact and tasked the “Department to draw on existing National Guard forces to build a Homeland Response Force (HRF) in each of the Federal Emergency management Agency (FEMA) regions.”⁵¹ The RRFs or the Secretary of Defenses’ proposed HRFs would be very similar organizations. The RRFs mission will be similar to the guard missions for organizing and supporting the CSTs and CERF-Ps. The CCMRFs (-) would continue to be filled with active duty forces and supplemented with reserve component forces. The ability to arrive at the incident site quickly would no

longer as important due to the proposed regional dispersion and quick reaction time of the RRFs. The proposed construct for the forces building the response would be similar to that proposed below in Figure 3.




Figure 3.

Conclusion

Based upon the strategic vision of senior leaders in the federal government and DOD, the United States has successfully established a new interagency department, DHS, and a new combatant command, NORTHCOM, to serve as the focal points for securing, defending, and restoring the homeland from the threat of future terrorist and conventional attacks. The HSC with a great deal of inter-agency support led the effort to establish a set of national planning scenarios to assist in focusing the planning effort across the federal government to combat these attacks. DHS, DOD and the rest of the inter-agency have developed plans to prevent, protect, respond and recover from WMD attacks against the homeland. Planners within these organizations are working to

ensure the federal government is prepared to react and recover in the event of a catastrophic, conventional or unconventional attack. Within DOD, the CST and CERF-P programs were established and these organizations have proven to be valuable but insufficient assets for a national consequence management response. NORTHCOM's analysis for greater capabilities required to respond to three catastrophic events, led to creation of the CCMRFs. We are now finding that while the CCMRF capabilities are exactly right, the organizational structure is not. The CCMRF does not arrive quickly enough to accomplish the first required mission, saving the lives of victims. The RRF fills the gap between the CERF-P and the CCMRF and if instituted, will save lives and assist in controlling the situation until the CCMRF (-) arrives at the site. This idea was codified in the recently released Quadrennial Defense Review Report when the Secretary of Defense directed DOD to "field faster, more flexible consequence management response forces."⁵² He also directed the "restructuring of the current CCMRF force"⁵³ and once again directed the National Guard to begin to build a Homeland Response Force (HRF) in each of the 10 FEMA regions to serve as the "link between the federal and state and local authorities. This QRD has essentially adopted the recommendations of this paper even before it was published."⁵⁴ In a few short years the leaders across the federal government, through their persistence and vision, have moved the United States much closer to preventing and being able to successfully recover from a WMD terrorist attack in the homeland if it were to happen.

Endnotes

¹ U.S. Government, *The 9-11 Commission Report, The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 22 July 2004), 280. On 26 February 1993, the World Trade Centers were targeted with a car bomb by Islamic Extremists.

The bomb was designed to detonate under the North Tower and designed to knock the North Tower into the South Tower. Had the attack been successfully executed, this would have been a major foreign borne attack and it would have killed thousands of people. This attack was not successful and only killed six people and injured over 1000.

² Ibid., 82. The Oklahoma City bombing occurred on April 19, 1995 when American militia movement sympathizer Timothy McVeigh, with the assistance of Terry Nichols destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. It was the most significant act of terrorism on American soil until the September 11 attacks in 2001.

³ U.S. Government, *The 9-11 Commission Report Executive Summary, The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 22 July 2004), 10.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., 11.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., 10.

⁹ Ibid., 14.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2005), 8.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² William J. Clinton, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The white House, October 1998), 19.

¹³ The National Security Council, *National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats* (Washington, DC: National Security Council, November 2009), 1-2.

¹⁴ Al Mauroni, *Where are the WMDs?* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 2-3.

¹⁵ U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, "Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS) for Federal Planning to Prevent, Protect Against, Respond To and Recover From Terrorist Use of Radiological Dispersion Devices in the United States," memorandum for Secretaries of Military Departments, Washington, DC, December 2008.

¹⁶ Bill Gertz, "Cohen Details Threats Posed by Baghdad," *Washington Times*, November 26, 1997.

¹⁷ Homeland Security Council, *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington, DC: Homeland Security Council, October 2007), 1-2.

¹⁸ Ibid., 4.

¹⁹ Daniel J. Shannahan, “*The Army’s role in Homeland Security*,” in Transformation Concepts for National Security in the 21st Century, ed. Williamson Murray (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002), 303.

²⁰ Dewar, James A. "The Importance of 'Wild Card' Scenarios," November, 2006, http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_2020_Support/2003_11_06_papers/dewar_nov6.pdf (accessed 23 November 2009).

²¹ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Federal Response Plan* (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, April 1999).

²² Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Plan* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, December 2004).

²³ Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, January 2008).

²⁴ Department of Homeland Security, *National Planning Scenarios* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, July 2004).

²⁵ Ibid., ii.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., vii.

²⁸ Major James Matthews, Nuclear Weapons Officer, Joint Staff, J3, CBRN Division, telephone interview by author, December 15, 2009.

²⁹ National Planning Scenarios, iii.

³⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *United States Northern Command Mission Statement* (Colorado Springs, CO: U.S. Department of Defense, 05 November 2007).

³¹ Shannahan, 303.

³² General Victor E. Renuart, Jr., “Testimony of General Victor E. Renuart, Jr., Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” March 17, 2009; <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/March/Renuart%2003-17-09.pdf> (accessed 03 December 2009).

³³ William J. Clinton, “Commencement Address at the U.S. Naval Academy: Annapolis, MD,” May 22, 1998, <http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19980522-4986.html> (accessed 11 December 2009).

³⁴ COL Robert M. Walk, “The Joint Senior Leader Course (JSLC),” briefing slides, Fort Leonard Wood, MO, U.S. Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear School (USACBRNS), 24 July 2009.

³⁵ “Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams,” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/wmd-cst.htm> (accessed 05 December 2009). This allowed one CST in every state and allowed additional teams in Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands and Washington, DC bringing the total number of CSTs to 57.

³⁶ Walk, JLSC Brief.

³⁷ *Posse Comitatus Act*, U.S. Code, title 18, sec. 1385 (2003). The Posse Comitatus Act is the primary statute/law that defines the limits of how military forces may be employed in various types of missions. Violation of these limits has well defined penalties: “Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”

³⁸ U.S. Assistant Secretary of Department of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale, “Assessment to Handle Multiple CBRNE Incidents Requiring Federal Assistance to State Authorities,” memorandum for Director, Joint Staff, Washington, DC: March 11, 2003.

³⁹ Walk, JLSC Brief.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ U.S. Government Accountability Office: *Homeland Defense, U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be Improved* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-09-849, September 2009) 48-50.

⁴² Walk, JLSC Brief.

⁴³ U.S. Departments of the Army and Air Force National Guard Bureau, *Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Management* (Washington, DC: U.S. Departments of the Army and Air Force National Guard Bureau, January 12, 2006), 4.

⁴⁴ U.S. Departments of the Army and Air Force National Guard Bureau, *National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package Management* (Washington, DC: U.S. Departments of the Army and Air Force National Guard Bureau, October 16, 2009), 4.

⁴⁵ Walk, JLSC Brief.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ McHale, “Assessment to Handle Multiple CBRNE Incidents.”

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ GAO, *Homeland Defense, U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise Program*.

⁵⁰ Walk, JLSC Brief.

⁵¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010), 19.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.